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Abstract 
Purpose.  Errors in eyewitness accounts can occur when a witness comes into contact 
with post-event ‘misinformation’. A common way to encounter misinformation is 
through face-to-face interaction, in particular via conversation with other individuals 
who also witnessed the crime. The current research compares this kind of 
misinformation with the non-social post event narrative method typically employed in 
laboratory studies. 
Method. Young (17-33 years) and older (58-80 years) adults viewed a simulated 
crime-event on video and were later exposed to four items of misinformation about it. 
The misinformation items were either introduced as part of a discussion about the 
event with a confederate or were embedded within a written-narrative about the event 
that participants were asked to read. A questionnaire containing twenty items about 
the event was given to participants before and after the experimental manipulation.  
Results. Participants were less accurate than controls on questionnaire items after 
encountering misinformation. More importantly, misinformation encountered socially 
was significantly more misleading than misinformation from a non-social source. This 
was true for both young and older adults.  
Conclusion. Misinformation encountered socially produced more errors than 
misinformation from a non-social source. This finding has implications both for 
applied (forensic) and theoretical understanding of eyewitness memory. 
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Say it to my face: Examining the effects of socially encountered misinformation 
 
When asked to remember an event, people often report information that they 
have encountered after the event, rather than what they originally experienced 
(Loftus, 1979). Within the eyewitness literature there has been a particular focus on 
the effects of encountering errant post-event information (misinformation), as this is a 
potentially serious cause of witness error. The act of reporting misinformation in 
place of the original information is known as the ‘misinformation effect’ (see Ayers & 
Reder, 1998; Wright & Loftus, 1998, for reviews of competing explanations for the 
misinformation effect). 
In real life, a common way to encounter post-event information is through 
face-to-face interaction, during conversation for example. Sharing our memories with 
others is a natural everyday activity, thus the potential to encounter misinformation in 
this way is considerable. However, with a few exceptions (see below), experimental 
eyewitness research has introduced misinformation to participants in several 
decidedly ‘non-social’ ways. For example, it has been incorporated into written post-
event narratives (Searcy, Bartlett & Memon, 2000; Wright & Stroud, 1998) or 
embedded within questions about the event (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). The literature 
provides ample evidence that such sources of misinformation can significantly distort 
reports of memory for an event. 
In our own prior studies (Gabbert, Memon & Allan, 2003; Wright, Self & 
Justice, 2000) we have demonstrated that significant memory distortion also arises 
when co-witnesses are allowed to discuss an event with one another prior to their 
memory being tested. This can result in ‘memory conformity’ where the individual 
memory report of one person becomes more similar to another person’s memory 
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report following their discussion of an event.  We consider this to be not only a 
‘natural’ source of misinformation but also, potentially, a very powerful one due to a 
variety of factors inherent in social discourse. The purpose of the experiment reported 
here was to examine whether, in fact, misinformation effects produced by 
‘conformity’ between co-witnesses exceed those produced by non-social sources of 
influence more typically employed in eyewitness research. 
One of the first studies to investigate memory conformity was Schneider and 
Watkins (1996). Their research was inspired by Asch’s (1956) classic studies of 
conformity in perception. Schneider and Watkins (1996, Experiment 2) presented 
pairs of participants with several words and then gave an old/new recognition test of 
the previously seen target words plus several previously unseen lures. One participant 
in each of the pairs was a confederate whose recognition response was given before 
the true participant gave his or her answer. The confederate’s response was either the 
correct answer or an incorrect answer. Results indicated that participants often 
complied with the answer given by the confederate, even when it was incorrect. 
In our recent research we have investigated memory conformity under 
ecologically valid conditions that approximate how memory conformity occurs in 
real-life. For example, Gabbert et al (2003) and Wright et al (2000) showed that a 
memory conformity effect can occur following a natural discussion between two 
witnesses about a mutually witnessed event. Wright et al (2000, Experiment 2) 
showed pairs of participants an identical crime, except that half saw an accomplice 
with the thief, and half did not. Initial memories were very accurate, but after 
discussing the crime with the other person in the pair, who saw a slightly different 
sequence, three quarters of the pairs exhibited conformity.  
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Gabbert et al (2003) investigated memory conformity effects between pairs of 
participants who viewed a simulated crime event on video. Participants were led to 
believe that they were seeing the same video of a crime scene. Although the two video 
clips contained exactly the same sequence of events, they were filmed from different 
angles to simulate different witness perspectives. Critically, this manipulation allowed 
different features of the event to be observed for each participant. After viewing, 
participants were asked to recall the event either alone or in pairs. An individual recall 
test was then administered to examine the effects of co-witness discussion on 
subsequent memory reports. A significant proportion (71%) of witnesses who had 
discussed the event reported at least one (out of two) erroneous detail acquired during 
the discussion with their co-witness.  
The current study builds upon our prior research by investigating whether 
errant post-event information encountered during a discussion results in a larger 
misinformation effect than when it is encountered non-socially (i.e. when reading a 
post event narrative). As indicated above, we believe that people will be more 
susceptible to post-event information if it is encountered in a social interaction. For 
example, people generally assume that information exchanged during the course of a 
normal discussion is truthful and accurate (see Grice, 1975; Swann, Giuliano & 
Wegner, 1982). Moreover, people may often want to appear to be in agreement with 
others, to appear more likeable (see Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  
Furthermore, the very medium of the post-event narrative, i.e., text, cannot 
convey additional information such as non-verbal influences (e.g. eye-contact, facial 
expressions, etc) or subtle social cues (e.g. perceived credibility, trustworthiness, 
confidence, etc) that may impact upon a person’s acceptance of information. The 
potential for experimenter-induced bias provides a good and pertinent example of 
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such (unintentional) non-verbally introduced effects that can alter results in line with 
the experimenter’s expectations (see Rosenthal, 1969). In this study we hold all 
experimental factors constant apart from the source of misinformation in order to 
investigate whether participants are more influenced by post-event information when 
it is encountered as part of a discussion than as part of a written narrative. 
In addition, the current study explores age differences in susceptibility to the 
post-event information presented socially or non-socially. Although it does seem clear 
that ageing is associated with increases in ‘source confusion’ that may exacerbate the 
distorting effect of misinformation (Schacter, Kihlstrom, Kaszniak & Valdiserri, 
1993), the existing eyewitness literature is inconsistent with regard to age-related 
changes in susceptibility to post-event misinformation. Mitchell, Johnson and Mather 
(2003) explored age differences in source monitoring performance using a standard 
misinformation paradigm and found that older adults (M = 76 years) were more likely 
than young adults (M = 19 years) to say that they saw information that was actually 
only suggested to them. Older adults were also found to be more confident in their 
source misattributions than were younger adults. Similarly, Karpel, Hoyer and Toglia 
(2001) found that older adults (M = 73 years) were more likely than young adults (M 
= 19 years) to falsely report items that had only been suggested to them (see also 
Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Loftus, Levidow & Deunsing, 1992).  
In contrast, Searcy et al (2000) found no significant differences in the 
susceptibility of young (M = 24 years) and elderly adults (M = 69 years) to 
misinformation (see also Bornstein, Witt, Cherry & Greene, 2000; Coxon & 
Valentine, 1997). Furthermore, Gabbert et al (2003) found that older adults (M = 69 
years) were just as susceptible to memory conformity as young adults (M = 20 years). 
This was despite the fact their memory performance was poorer than younger adults 
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in terms of the amount of correct items of information reported about the event. The 
inconsistent effect of ageing on susceptibility to misinformation clearly warrants 
further investigation. 
It is also possible that age-related differences in susceptibility to post-event 
information might be exaggerated when the information is encountered as part of 
social interaction. For example, older adults are often aware that certain memory 
abilities decline with age, so tend to be less confident about trusting their own 
memory (Stevens, Kaplan, Ponds, Diederiks, & Jolles, 1999). Having less confidence 
in one’s own memory might entail greater reliance on other sources of information. 
Thus, Dixon (1992; 1996; see also Craik, 1986) proposed that in everyday life older 
adults might compensate for memory decline by using external memory aids such as 
writing lists, keeping a diary, etc. Collaboration with other individuals has been 
recognised as a common compensatory mechanism for older adults to employ (Dixon, 
1996; Thompson & Conway, 2001). One possible side-effect of this compensatory 
mechanism, that we intend to explore in the current research, is whether older adults 
are increasingly susceptible to post-event information encountered during 
collaborative recall as opposed to post-event information encountered via some non-
social source, such as reading a narrative. 
In summary, the current research aims to explore the differential effects that 
alternative sources of post-event information can have on recall for a witnessed event. 
We propose that post-event information encountered as part of a social interaction 
will be more likely to distort memory reports than a post-event narrative. We also 
examine whether there are age-related differences in susceptibility to the post-event 
information. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 210 participants were tested. This n was based on power analysis for 
approximately a medium effect size, and at an α of .05 (Cohen, 1977, table 7.3.16). Of 
the 210 participants, 108 were undergraduate students from the University of 
Aberdeen (17-33 years; M = 20.39; SD = 3.5), taking part in return for course-credit. 
The remaining 102 participants were older adults recruited from the local community 
(58-80 years; M = 68.92; SD = 5.9) who were paid for their contribution to the study. 
The older participants underwent the Memory Impairment Screen (MIS, Buschke, 
Kuslansky, Katz, Stewart, Sliwinsky, Eckholdt & Lipton, 1999). This is a screening 
tool designed to identify individuals who should be considered for further evaluation 
for possible Alzheimer’s disease or other forms of dementia. A cut off score of 4 or 
less suggests impairment and warrants appropriate diagnostic assessment. The mean 
score in the current study was 7.77 (Range = 5 to 8). Thus no older participants were 
excluded. 
The study employed a 3 (condition: biased confederate; biased narrative; 
control) X 2 (age-group: young; old) between subjects design. 
Materials 
Event. A simulated robbery (1 minute, 25 seconds) was filmed at a 
Blockbuster Video store. The characters in the event included two robbers, one 
employee, and one customer. 
Recall Measures. A cued recall questionnaire containing twenty questions 
about the event (see Appendix One) was given to participants before and after the 
manipulation phase. Of these twenty questions, four related to the items of 
misinformation given in the experimental manipulation (in the confederate and post-
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event narrative conditions). These four questions could be answered with details 
witnessed in the event or with the misinformation. The remaining sixteen questions 
were neutral, and could be answered with details from the event only.  
Procedure  
Participants took part individually. Those participants in the biased-
confederate condition completed the experiment with a confederate whom they 
believed to be another participant. Participants were always matched with 
confederates from the same age group as themselves. The confederates were trained 
to act as though they were a genuine naïve participant who had never before met the 
experimenter nor completed the experiment. 
On arrival, participants were seated in front of the television monitor and 
asked to watch a short video. In the biased-confederate condition, the participant and 
confederate watched the video together. Ten minutes of filler tasks followed. 
Participants were then given the 20-item cued-recall questionnaire to complete, and 
were asked not to guess at any answer. No time limits were imposed. On completion, 
participants completed a further 20 minutes of filler tasks before the manipulation 
phase.  
Participants in the biased-narrative condition were asked to read through a 
typed post-event narrative containing a summary of the event seen earlier on video. 
They were informed that the narrative was an account given by a previous participant 
within the same age group as themselves. The narrative described the event, but did 
not contain details that could be used to answer any of the 16 neutral items in the 
cued-recall questionnaire. Crucially, four items of misinformation were embedded 
within the narrative, suggesting that;  
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1) the employee was stacking shelves at the beginning of the video (whereas in fact 
he was standing by the till),  
2) the main robber handed the bag of stolen money to his accomplice before leaving 
the store (in fact this does not happen),  
3) the main robber was wearing a leather jacket (in fact he was wearing a cloth jacket 
with two white stripes), 
4) the main robber’s accomplice had a gun (in fact he had nothing in his hands at all). 
Participants were allowed to read through the narrative at their own pace. In 
response to questions (e.g. “Did this happen?”), the experimenter simply re-iterated 
that the narrative was simply a previous participant’s account and that no further 
information could be provided.  
Participants in the biased-confederate condition were instructed that they had 
a short amount of time to discuss the video together as a pair (i.e., with the 
confederate). The confederate was trained to disclose the same information, and 
misinformation, as was present in the biased post-event narrative. In the face of 
disagreement from the real participant, the confederate was instructed to simply state 
“Oh, well I thought I saw…(the repeated relevant item of misinformation)” rather 
than pursue an argument about what actually happened. If the participant talked about 
items that were relevant to the 16 neutral questions the confederate was trained to 
listen without comment, and then steer the conversation back to event details that 
were of no relation to the recall test. 
The narrative used in the control condition was the same as in the biased post-
narrative condition, but with the four items of misinformation omitted. As such, the 
content was accurate, but could not be used to answer any of the cued-recall 
questions. 
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When the manipulation phase was complete, participants engaged in a further 
20 minutes of filler tasks before being given the same 20 item cued-recall 
questionnaire once again. Participants were instructed to answer the questions with 
details recalled from the video. This instruction was written at the top of the 
questionnaire as well as being emphasised by the experimenter. Once again, 
participants were reminded not to guess at any of the answers. Finally, a manipulation 
check was given. Participants were asked if they had guessed the true purpose of the 
experiment, to which no one expressed suspicion. Furthermore, those in the biased-
confederate condition were typically surprised to learn that the confederate was not 
actually a true participant. 
Coding.  
The 20 item cued-recall questionnaire given prior to the manipulation phase 
was scored in terms of the number of neutral questions correctly answered (thus the 
maximum score possible is 16). At the second completion of this questionnaire (post 
manipulation phase) the 16 neutral questions were scored as before, and a 
‘misinformation score’ was calculated by counting how many of the four critical 
questions had been answered with misinformation. This ‘misinformation score’ 
comprised answers that had changed from the original response given in the first 
recall questionnaire, and those answers that had been added after no response had 
originally been provided (see Table 1).  
(Table 1 about here) 
Inter-rater reliability checks, based on a random sample of ten transcripts, 
showed a significant level of agreement between two independent coders for the 
accuracy scores in Recall 1 (r = .93), Recall 2 (r = .95), and for the ‘misinformation’ 
scores (r = 1.00).  
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Results 
Our analyses of memory conformity and memory accuracy focused on two 
issues: First, are witnesses more likely to conform to post-event information 
encountered during a discussion (socially) than acquired from a written narrative 
(non-socially)?  Second, is the pattern of results achieved replicated within the sample 
of older adults?  
Memory Conformity. 
Data from the control group were initially explored to check that critical items 
were not reported in this condition. By chance, participants had reported a single 
critical item on two occasions that had neither been witnessed nor encountered as 
post-event information. In comparison to control group data, participants in the 
biased-confederate and biased-narrative conditions often reported misinformation. 
The means for young and old participants combined were .03, 1.77, and 1.27 for the 
control, biased-confederate, and biased-narrative conditions respectively.  With only 
two reports of misinformation, the data from the control group do not meet the 
assumptions for further statistical tests.  Therefore the remaining analyses will focus 
on the two experimental groups. 
A Univariate ANOVA was performed to examine the average number of 
misinformation items (out of four) reported by condition (biased-confederate, biased-
narrative) and age group (young, old). A main effect of condition was revealed  (F (1, 
136) = 5.65; p = .019; MSe = 8.54; η² = .04), where participants (young and old 
combined) were more influenced in the biased-confederate condition than the biased-
narrative condition (M’s = 1.77 and 1.27, respectively). Calculating the odds ratio 
revealed that the odds of reporting misinformation was 1.70 times higher for 
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participants in the biased-confederate condition rather than the biased-narrative 
condition. 
A main effect of age group was also found (F (1, 136) = 8.71; p = .004; MSe = 
13.17; η² = .06), with young participants reporting significantly more misinformation 
than older participants overall (M’s = 1.82, and 1.21, for young and old participants 
respectively). No significant interaction was apparent between age group and 
condition (p = 34; F < 1). See Table 2 for the percentage of misinformation reported 
by age group and experimental condition. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Changes and Additions. 
The items of misinformation reported in recall-two were further analysed to 
see how many answers had changed from the original response given in recall-one, 
and how many answers had been added, following no response being given originally 
in recall-one (please refer back to Table 1 for examples of each). Within the biased-
narrative condition, 41.6% of responses had changed from an original response. In the 
biased-confederate condition 55.7% of responses had been changed. Thus, 
participants were more likely to change an original response when in the biased-
confederate condition as opposed to the biased-narrative condition (t = 3.02; df = 138; 
p = .003). No differences between the experimental conditions were found in relation 
to the number of additions that had been made (t = .29; df = 138; p = .77). 
  
Memory Accuracy. 
 Accuracy was measured using the number of correct responses given to the 16 
neutral questions in the cued-recall questionnaire. Recall 1 (pre-manipulation stage) 
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and Recall 2 (post-manipulation stage) were initially examined individually (see 
Table 3 for the mean accuracy scores). 
(Table 3 about here) 
A Univariate ANOVA, with the number of correct responses to the 16 neutral 
questions in Recall One as the dependent variable, found a main effect of age-group 
(F (1, 204) = 60.10; p < .001; MSE  = 280.16; η² = .23), where younger adults were 
more accurate overall  (M’s = 10.05 and 7.74 for younger and older adults 
respectively). No main effect of experimental condition was found, and there was no 
significant interaction between age group and experimental condition (F’s < 1).  
The same analysis for Recall Two revealed a significant interaction between 
age group and experimental condition (F (2, 204) = 6.31; p = .002; MSe = 26.79; η² = 
.06). Older adults were significantly less accurate than young adults in the control and 
biased-narrative conditions, however, those in the biased-confederate condition 
performed at a level that did not significantly differ to younger adults (F (1, 68) = 
2.83; p = .10; MSe = 13.92; η² = .04). Thus it seems that discussion with a 
confederate actually aided the memory performance of older adults.1 
When comparing performance in Recall 1 to that in Recall 2, both young and 
older adults were found to report significantly more correct responses when 
answering the questions for the second time (F (1, 105) = 62.37; p < .001; MSe = 
75.85; η² = .37, and F (1, 99) = 64.53; p < .001; MSe = 70.59; η² = .40, for young and 
older adults respectively). No interaction between performance on the recall 
questionnaires and experimental condition was found for the young adults (F<1). 
However, this interaction was significant for the older adults (F (2, 99) = 14.68; p < 
.001; MSe = 16.06; η² = .23) indicating that older adults in the biased confederate 
                                                 
1
   People in the confederate condition reported more misinformation and more correct information than 
people in the biased narrative condition.  If analyses are run in a combined repeated measures analysis 
on the proportion recalled, the interaction between type of item and condition is nonsignificant (F<1).   
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group performed significantly better in Recall 2 than those in the other two 
experimental groups (as mentioned previously). 
 
Discussion 
We observed significant differences in susceptibility to post-event 
misinformation originating from a social versus a non-social source. Our hypothesis 
was confirmed, for both the young and the older groups, that socially encountered 
misinformation would distort memory reports more than non-socially encountered 
misinformation. It is important to note that the memory accuracy results from Recall 
One (pre-manipulation) indicate that participants’ receiving social and non-social 
forms of misinformation had equivalent memory performance. This finding indicates 
that the more substantial effect of the socially encountered misinformation at Recall 
Two was not due to pre-existing group differences in memory. 
 Chiefly, the present findings demonstrate the potent influence upon memory 
of misinformation conveyed to an eyewitness in the ‘natural’ context of a discussion. 
When conveyed socially in this way the misinformation not only distorts the accuracy 
of an eyewitness report, it also produces systematic but spurious correspondences 
between witness reports. The relative strength of the misinformation effect 
demonstrated here, and the obvious forensic problem produced by witnesses who 
conform, makes for an unfortunate combination. All the more unfortunate because in 
the forensic setting it is often the case that witnesses who have just seen a crime are 
likely to discuss their experience with one another. For example, a recent survey 
(Paterson & Kemp, 2003) of real-life eyewitnesses in Australia found that 86% of 
respondents who had co-witnessed a criminal event admitted to discussing it with 
another witness. The present findings suggest that if one witness recalls errant pieces 
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of information then these could very well have a negative influence upon the other 
witness’s memory for what actually happened. Moreover, as noted above, in the 
forensic situation conformity between eyewitnesses could produce falsely 
corroborating elements in their reports, with serious consequences for the criminal 
investigation in which the witnesses are taking part. Witness evidence has been 
contaminated in exactly this way in some high-profile cases, such as the Oklahoma 
Bombing Trial (see Memon & Wright, 1999). 
Very few studies within the eyewitness literature have employed a confederate 
to impart misinformation during a live interaction. Our findings here suggest that 
studies which have employed other means, for example presenting misleading 
information from a fictitious co-witness, with no interaction (see Betz, Skowronski, & 
Ostrom, 1996; Luus & Wells, 1994, Experiment 1), may considerably underestimate 
the level of distortion produced by social interaction. Our findings therefore underline 
the importance of ecological validity in laboratory-based studies of social influence 
upon eyewitness memory. 
Similar conclusions have recently been drawn by Meade and Roediger (2002), 
using a recognition test rather than a recall test. Meade and Roediger (2002) examined 
the impact of social influence on the development of false memories across a series of 
experiments. They discovered, serendipitously, that post-event information had a 
greater impact when supplied by an actual confederate rather than a hypothetical one. 
A follow-up experiment was conducted to specifically explore the relative power of 
implied and actual co-witness presence and again it was found that participants were 
more likely to incorporate the erroneous responses of an actual confederate on a 
recognition test relative to those of a virtual confederate. Thus our own results and 
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those of Meade and Roediger’s (2002) show that it is not just misinformation per se 
that affects memory, but also how it is encountered. 
Before turning to our age-related findings, we would like to emphasise one 
last point regarding the potency of misinformation encountered via discussion with a 
co-witness. Our analysis of the changes versus additions from Recall One to Two 
revealed that participants were significantly more likely to change a response when 
the misinformation had been encountered from their confederate, as opposed to being 
read. We would argue that changes in response from Recall One to Two represent a 
more powerful demonstration of memory conformity per se than response additions, 
because the latter could reflect forgetting of specific details that would bring the 
misinformation into dispute. The fact that more changes were made in the biased-
confederate condition supports our hypothesis that misinformation presented socially 
has a greater influence on memory reports. 
As mentioned in the introduction, Dixon (1996) and Thompson and Conway 
(2001) have both found evidence for ‘collaborative expertise’ in older adults, where 
memory collaboration can provide cognitive support that is able to compensate for an 
individual's age-related memory losses. Accordingly, we had hypothesized that the 
use of joint recall as a compensatory mechanism might make older adults more 
susceptible than the young to the influence of socially encountered misinformation.  
Although we did find that the number of reported misinformation items was highest, 
for older adults, in the biased-confederate condition, the increase did not exceed that 
found for younger adults. 
Although all groups (young, old, biased, not biased etc) improved in Recall 
Two compared to Recall One (i.e. suggesting hypermnesia, see Roediger & Payne, 
1985), we also found that older adults particularly benefited from being able to 
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discuss the event with the confederate. That is, the memory performance of older 
adults improved following a discussion of the event, despite the fact that the 
confederate did not impart any information that could be used to answer the neutral 
questions in the recall test. In fact, older adult performance in the biased confederate 
condition improved to the extent that it did not differ from the younger adult group. 
Thus, the act of collaboration appears to provide older adults with support, enabling 
their performance to improve (see also Craik, Byrd & Swanson, 1987, for a discussion 
of the benefits of environmental support for older adults).  
The age effects also indicated that susceptibility to misinformation does not 
seem to bear a simple relationship to memory for the original event (see Gabbert et al, 
2003, for similar findings). For example, older adults were less likely to report the 
misinformation even though their memory for the event was poorer in comparison 
with younger adults. Conversely, younger adults were more likely to report 
misinformation despite being significantly more accurate about event details overall. 
Why were younger adults more influenced by the misinformation than older adults? 
The notion of peer pressure may be apt, i.e. that the younger adults may have a 
particular concern with being accepted and in agreement with other persons, a factor 
that seems to be relatively strong in this age group compared to older adults (see 
Borsari & Carey, 2001, for a review of why young adults succumb to peer pressure). 
Finally, we began the introduction to this paper by noting that there are 
various, sometimes competing, theoretical accounts of the misinformation effect. We 
do not know, at present, whether such accounts alone will be able to provide a 
satisfying explanation for the incorporation of socially encountered misinformation 
into eyewitness reports. We cannot rule out the possibility that discussion with a co-
witness could distort or overwrite specific elements of memory for the original event 
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(see Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; Loftus, 
Miller, & Burns, 1978; Wright & Stroud, 1998). It is also possible that participants 
could have confused the context in which the original and post-event misinformation 
were presented, resulting in ‘source’ confusion (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 
1993; Zaragosa & Lane, 1994).  
Perhaps conformity between eyewitnesses is simply a result of memory 
distortions or mechanisms such as those just described, but the point is moot until 
much further work has been carried out. It would be informative in this regard to 
know if the same factors that influence the strength of socially encountered 
misinformation effect the strength of misinformation from  non-social sources. 
Although various factors affecting the misinformation effect have been identified in 
prior studies (e.g. study-test delay interval, distinctiveness, exposure duration and 
trace-strength manipulations), the extent to which co-witnesses can disregard, i.e. 
exclude, socially (versus non-socially) encountered misinformation would be worth 
exploring. This could be achieved by giving witnesses source-monitoring instructions, 
warning them (at test) that the misinformation was in fact errant, and should be 
withheld or indicated as such in their recall (see Wright, 1993). This seems, to us, to 
be a worthwhile goal also from the forensic point of view, where the issue of how to 
distinguish between true and false corroboration between witness reports has 
considerable weight.
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Appendix One 
 
1. Did the employee open the till on his left or right first? 
2. Which of the robbers entered the shop first? 
3. What time of day did the robbery occur? 
4. What was the customer wearing? 
5. What was the employee doing at the beginning of the film? 
6. What direction did the robbers run off in after leaving the shop? 
7. How did the robbers disguise their faces? 
8. How would you describe the robber’s accents? 
9. What was the main robber wearing? 
10. What did the robbers do before leaving the shop? 
11. What type of bag was handed to the employee? 
12. Did the robber hand the bag to the employee with his left or right hand? 
13. Who had the bag containing the money when the robbers left the shop? 
14. Was there a CCTV camera in the store? 
15. How was the customer attacked? 
16. How did the main robber get the employee to hurry up? 
17. What did the robber by the door have in his hand? 
18. How would you describe the employee’s hairstyle? 
19. What was thrown by the main robber? 
20. What colour hair did the robber by the door have? 
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Question  Pre-manipulation 
response 
Post-manipulation 
response 
What was the employee doing 
at the beginning of the film? 
 “Working behind 
the till” 
“Stacking shelves” 
Who had the bag containing 
the money when the robbers 
left the shop? 
 No answer 
provided 
“The main robber 
handed the bag to the 
robber by the door” 
 
 Table 1: Examples of pre and post manipulation responses 
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 Control 
Condition 
Biased-
Narrative 
Biased-
Confederate 
Young Adults 1.5% 
(5.8%) 
36.7% 
(31.3%) 
54.2% 
(32.4%) 
Older Adults 0% 
(0%) 
26.5% 
(28.2%) 
33.7% 
(30.7%) 
 
Table 2: Mean percentage of misinformation reported by age group and condition 
(standard deviations in parentheses). 
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 Recall One  Recall Two 
 Control Biased 
Narrative 
Biased 
Confed 
 
 
Control Biased 
Narrative 
Biased 
Confed 
 
Young 
adults 
 
10.19 
(2.07) 
 
 
9.86 
(2.17) 
 
10.08 
(1.89) 
 
 
 
11.44 
(1.96) 
 
10.92 
(1.90) 
 
11.33 
(2.07) 
 
Older 
adults 
 
 
7.65 
(2.30) 
 
7.41 
(2.02) 
 
8.15 
(2.49) 
 
 
 
8.35 
(2.24) 
 
7.94 
(1.77) 
 
10.44 
(2.36) 
 
Table 3: Mean number of accurate details (out of 16) reported in Recall One and Two, 
broken down by age and experimental condition (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 
 
 
 
